Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software.
Invasion.
trary and despotic one . Therefore it is plainly our interest not to fig ht the invader on his first landing , unless we have cause to sUrmise [ which 1 . think we have not , notwithstanding the madness of the times ] that our patriotic republicans will join the French in any considerable numbers , in order to set up a tyrannical form of government , similar to that of France . But I rely more on their fears to keep them quiet , than on their princiles of loyalty or- of honour . . And therefore I press the
p maxim again , that if the French should make good their landing , it is our interest not immediately to lig ht them . It has been observed before , that the invaders would endeavour to land as near to the capital as they could , and as opposite to their own coasts ( Avith which they must keep up a constant correspondence ) as the nature of the case Avould permit ; consequently , the place or places of
their debarkation could not be less than 70 miles distant from the metropolis ,.- Suppose a medium betAA-een those , viz . 105- miles . Now , in that space of country , there certainly mig ht be found at least 10 or zo or 30 places , strong b y nature , and quickly to be fortified b y art , so far as to enable three or four battalions at each place , aided by three or four companies of lig ht horse and of light infantry , to hold out against the ivhole invading army for a few days . This method of carrying on the Avar by various , posts , or redoubts , instead of coming to a pitched decisive battle , is what distresses an invading enemy the most
of any thing , because he knoAVS that at last he- must be ruined by it . Therefore , let us HOAV proceed in this VICAV of things : the few English battalions before mentioned , being dislodged from the first post or redoubt , retire to a second , perhaps at the distance of ten or twelve miles further ; the light horse and lig ht infantry bringing up their rear , and covering their retreat . The troops stationed in- ' the second post being thus joined by the retreating battalions , and by the li ght horse
and li g ht infantry of the first , become proportionally stronger , and therefore make more vigorous resistance : from the second , we will suppose , that a retreat is made in the same manner to a third , and also to the fourth , the fifth , and so on , their numbers and their strength still increasing , whilst the numbers and strength of the invaders are diminishing every hour : till at last , tired by perpetual fatigues , harrassed
by the continual incursions of the light troops , dispirited b y seeing no end to their labours , suffering through the Avant of provisions , enfeebled by the losses sustained in so many blood y encounters , thinned by desertions , b y sickness , and b y every other calamity attending a sinkingcause , the feAV remains of this grand and formidable army are obliged to surrender themselves prisoners of Avar , much after the same manner as the army under the famous Charles XII . of Sweden Avas compelled to do at PultOAva , and as General Burgovne lately did at Saratoga .
As to the invasion of Ireland : —Ireland is much more distant from tlie enemy ' s coast than England is : and therefore the great fleet of transports necessary for such an invasion , is so much the more liable to be destroyed by our frigates , cutters , and cruizers , not to mention the various accidents of storms and tempests to be expected in so long a navigation in those seas , aijd on those shores;—after landing , the
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software.
Invasion.
trary and despotic one . Therefore it is plainly our interest not to fig ht the invader on his first landing , unless we have cause to sUrmise [ which 1 . think we have not , notwithstanding the madness of the times ] that our patriotic republicans will join the French in any considerable numbers , in order to set up a tyrannical form of government , similar to that of France . But I rely more on their fears to keep them quiet , than on their princiles of loyalty or- of honour . . And therefore I press the
p maxim again , that if the French should make good their landing , it is our interest not immediately to lig ht them . It has been observed before , that the invaders would endeavour to land as near to the capital as they could , and as opposite to their own coasts ( Avith which they must keep up a constant correspondence ) as the nature of the case Avould permit ; consequently , the place or places of
their debarkation could not be less than 70 miles distant from the metropolis ,.- Suppose a medium betAA-een those , viz . 105- miles . Now , in that space of country , there certainly mig ht be found at least 10 or zo or 30 places , strong b y nature , and quickly to be fortified b y art , so far as to enable three or four battalions at each place , aided by three or four companies of lig ht horse and of light infantry , to hold out against the ivhole invading army for a few days . This method of carrying on the Avar by various , posts , or redoubts , instead of coming to a pitched decisive battle , is what distresses an invading enemy the most
of any thing , because he knoAVS that at last he- must be ruined by it . Therefore , let us HOAV proceed in this VICAV of things : the few English battalions before mentioned , being dislodged from the first post or redoubt , retire to a second , perhaps at the distance of ten or twelve miles further ; the light horse and lig ht infantry bringing up their rear , and covering their retreat . The troops stationed in- ' the second post being thus joined by the retreating battalions , and by the li ght horse
and li g ht infantry of the first , become proportionally stronger , and therefore make more vigorous resistance : from the second , we will suppose , that a retreat is made in the same manner to a third , and also to the fourth , the fifth , and so on , their numbers and their strength still increasing , whilst the numbers and strength of the invaders are diminishing every hour : till at last , tired by perpetual fatigues , harrassed
by the continual incursions of the light troops , dispirited b y seeing no end to their labours , suffering through the Avant of provisions , enfeebled by the losses sustained in so many blood y encounters , thinned by desertions , b y sickness , and b y every other calamity attending a sinkingcause , the feAV remains of this grand and formidable army are obliged to surrender themselves prisoners of Avar , much after the same manner as the army under the famous Charles XII . of Sweden Avas compelled to do at PultOAva , and as General Burgovne lately did at Saratoga .
As to the invasion of Ireland : —Ireland is much more distant from tlie enemy ' s coast than England is : and therefore the great fleet of transports necessary for such an invasion , is so much the more liable to be destroyed by our frigates , cutters , and cruizers , not to mention the various accidents of storms and tempests to be expected in so long a navigation in those seas , aijd on those shores;—after landing , the