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On The Impression Of Reality Attending Dramatic Representations.
ON THE IMPRESSION OF REALITY ATTENDING DRAMATIC REPRESENTATIONS .
BY J . A IK IN , M . D .
IFrom ihe MEMOIRS of the LITKIIAJIY and PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY of MAX * CIIKSTKII , Vol . IP . jusl published . ] DR . Johnson , in his Preface to Shakespear , excuses that great poet ' s violation of the Dramatic Unities , and argues against the law by which they have been enjoined , upon this principle—That asin factweare never so deceived by a dramatic
, , , representation as to believe it real , there is no danger of injuring its effect by any thing which may tend to destroy such a ' belief . And he seems to triumph not a little , in exposing the absurdity of an imagined conviction , that a scene passing before our eyes is real , when we are all the time conscious that it began in fiction . But it appears to me , that in this instance ( as perhaps in many othersthe critihas
) c taken a very narrow survey of the human mind , and has only skimmed the surface for that truth which lay somewhat deeper . The question respecting the nature of that feeling which a scene of fiction excites in us , must be determined by a reference to the general mode in which the mind receives impressions . NowI shall attempt to shewthat although the b
, , means y which emotions are raised are very various , yet that , when raised , they are all precisely the same in their nature , and only differ in degree of intensity . This , I think , will manifestly appear , if , in the first place , the same principle which is necessary to account for the effect of one of these means , will equally account for all ; and , in the second place , if the evident and external expressions of our
emotions are similar in every case . Why is it that the view of a real scene of distress , in which we are not personally concerned , operates upon our feelings , but in consequence of that general principle of our nature , whereby the image of human passions in another , excites corresponding emotions in ourselves ? Reality itself cannot operate upon us without a medium ; and in what respect does the action produced bthe direct
y medium of the senses , differ from that produced by the remoter mediums of recollection , narration , or any mode of fictitious representation ? I behoW a perspn suffering under the extremity of torture , and find myself highly affected at the spectacle . I make his feelings in some respect my own;—my flesh creeps upon my bones , and the pain of sympathy rises to such a degree as to become in
- tolerable . It is now over , and that portion of human misery has no longer an existence . Still the scene recurs to my mind , and whenever it intrudes , all my pain is renewed , though with less intensity ; and this continues to be the case till the ideas fade away . The identity of the sensation is proved by the sameness of the cor-
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software.
On The Impression Of Reality Attending Dramatic Representations.
ON THE IMPRESSION OF REALITY ATTENDING DRAMATIC REPRESENTATIONS .
BY J . A IK IN , M . D .
IFrom ihe MEMOIRS of the LITKIIAJIY and PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY of MAX * CIIKSTKII , Vol . IP . jusl published . ] DR . Johnson , in his Preface to Shakespear , excuses that great poet ' s violation of the Dramatic Unities , and argues against the law by which they have been enjoined , upon this principle—That asin factweare never so deceived by a dramatic
, , , representation as to believe it real , there is no danger of injuring its effect by any thing which may tend to destroy such a ' belief . And he seems to triumph not a little , in exposing the absurdity of an imagined conviction , that a scene passing before our eyes is real , when we are all the time conscious that it began in fiction . But it appears to me , that in this instance ( as perhaps in many othersthe critihas
) c taken a very narrow survey of the human mind , and has only skimmed the surface for that truth which lay somewhat deeper . The question respecting the nature of that feeling which a scene of fiction excites in us , must be determined by a reference to the general mode in which the mind receives impressions . NowI shall attempt to shewthat although the b
, , means y which emotions are raised are very various , yet that , when raised , they are all precisely the same in their nature , and only differ in degree of intensity . This , I think , will manifestly appear , if , in the first place , the same principle which is necessary to account for the effect of one of these means , will equally account for all ; and , in the second place , if the evident and external expressions of our
emotions are similar in every case . Why is it that the view of a real scene of distress , in which we are not personally concerned , operates upon our feelings , but in consequence of that general principle of our nature , whereby the image of human passions in another , excites corresponding emotions in ourselves ? Reality itself cannot operate upon us without a medium ; and in what respect does the action produced bthe direct
y medium of the senses , differ from that produced by the remoter mediums of recollection , narration , or any mode of fictitious representation ? I behoW a perspn suffering under the extremity of torture , and find myself highly affected at the spectacle . I make his feelings in some respect my own;—my flesh creeps upon my bones , and the pain of sympathy rises to such a degree as to become in
- tolerable . It is now over , and that portion of human misery has no longer an existence . Still the scene recurs to my mind , and whenever it intrudes , all my pain is renewed , though with less intensity ; and this continues to be the case till the ideas fade away . The identity of the sensation is proved by the sameness of the cor-