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Remarks
REMARKS
On Mr . 11 ' irgmans Divarication of the Xew Testament into Doctrine and History , by William Greville Jones . OF this work no extended analysis has been published , at least as far as we know . Soon after the first edition came out it was noticed at some length in a sprightly magazine edited by the sons of the present member for Oldham ; and a promise was made that the review . - ( which
was confined to an exposition of the scope and intention of the DIVARICATION ) would be resumed in future numbers until a full exposition should be made of the metaphysical system which had given origin to the work , and of the consequences which might be expected to result from its dissemination . No continuation however appeared , and the circumstance is mentioned chiefly for the purpose of explaining that the partial notice alluded toand the present articleare from the same
, , hand ; an explanation not otherwise necessary , except to shew that a similarity in the course of argument , does not arise from our having copied the ideas of a predecessor . The word divarication , ( happily rescued , we think , from obsoleteness by its present application ) , means a separation of any thing into two parts . Mr . "Wirgman endeavours to showthat in the sacred Scriptures
, there exist two principles , distinct from , although not necessarily at variance with , each other ; namely , a divine code of moral laws manifestly of perfect truth , and the history of a series of mortal actions resting upon human evidence , and therefore probabilities only . He makes this divarication on the following grounds : —1 . That there
is m all men s minds a criterion of what is morally right and wrong , which criterion is universal and uniform . 2 . That of every thing historical , i . e . depending on evidence derived from the recorded sensations of another , there exists no proof . There may exist so much likelihood that we may be prone to believe it implicitly , but never can we asseverate it with the same certainty as we can what we have seen . Nor indeed ( though the reflection is merely en passant " ) can we affirm so positively that what we see exists ( the sense of siht being liable to
g so many optical illusions ) as we can be assured that " to do unto others as we would they should do unto us , " is right . Now comes the palpable question and the important doubt , How do you discover this boasted criterion ? The savage thinks it the hi ghest point of morality to inmolate even by assassination the offspring of the man who has accidentally caused tlie death of one of his remotest clansmen . A modern soldier , not less barbarous , deems the intemperate
expression of a drunken friend an excuse for drawing a trigger against his life ; while the quaker professes to bear buffets and blows—nay , pillage and slaughter—without resistance . Is the moral feeling then equal ? Yes ! In the first , place , let us remark , that although thc powers of the reasoning faculty , riistorted by passion , may fail to inform us of what is right ; the admiration of what ive believe , to be right , is universal and uniform ; and with respect to the actions above quoted , although in their full developement wrong and unreasonable , they are in some measure based upon moral axioms common to all mankind and which \ ol .. II . T
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software.
Remarks
REMARKS
On Mr . 11 ' irgmans Divarication of the Xew Testament into Doctrine and History , by William Greville Jones . OF this work no extended analysis has been published , at least as far as we know . Soon after the first edition came out it was noticed at some length in a sprightly magazine edited by the sons of the present member for Oldham ; and a promise was made that the review . - ( which
was confined to an exposition of the scope and intention of the DIVARICATION ) would be resumed in future numbers until a full exposition should be made of the metaphysical system which had given origin to the work , and of the consequences which might be expected to result from its dissemination . No continuation however appeared , and the circumstance is mentioned chiefly for the purpose of explaining that the partial notice alluded toand the present articleare from the same
, , hand ; an explanation not otherwise necessary , except to shew that a similarity in the course of argument , does not arise from our having copied the ideas of a predecessor . The word divarication , ( happily rescued , we think , from obsoleteness by its present application ) , means a separation of any thing into two parts . Mr . "Wirgman endeavours to showthat in the sacred Scriptures
, there exist two principles , distinct from , although not necessarily at variance with , each other ; namely , a divine code of moral laws manifestly of perfect truth , and the history of a series of mortal actions resting upon human evidence , and therefore probabilities only . He makes this divarication on the following grounds : —1 . That there
is m all men s minds a criterion of what is morally right and wrong , which criterion is universal and uniform . 2 . That of every thing historical , i . e . depending on evidence derived from the recorded sensations of another , there exists no proof . There may exist so much likelihood that we may be prone to believe it implicitly , but never can we asseverate it with the same certainty as we can what we have seen . Nor indeed ( though the reflection is merely en passant " ) can we affirm so positively that what we see exists ( the sense of siht being liable to
g so many optical illusions ) as we can be assured that " to do unto others as we would they should do unto us , " is right . Now comes the palpable question and the important doubt , How do you discover this boasted criterion ? The savage thinks it the hi ghest point of morality to inmolate even by assassination the offspring of the man who has accidentally caused tlie death of one of his remotest clansmen . A modern soldier , not less barbarous , deems the intemperate
expression of a drunken friend an excuse for drawing a trigger against his life ; while the quaker professes to bear buffets and blows—nay , pillage and slaughter—without resistance . Is the moral feeling then equal ? Yes ! In the first , place , let us remark , that although thc powers of the reasoning faculty , riistorted by passion , may fail to inform us of what is right ; the admiration of what ive believe , to be right , is universal and uniform ; and with respect to the actions above quoted , although in their full developement wrong and unreasonable , they are in some measure based upon moral axioms common to all mankind and which \ ol .. II . T