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Remarks
if the soul were neither matter nor motion , it must be nothing—but thaS as it produced effects , it must be something ; and then these logicians give us a choice of whether it shall be a fine matter , an essence , or an animal spirit ; or whether it be a secretion , and whether it is lodged in the heart , or the brain , or the pineal gland . Now the great claims of Kant consist , first , in pointing out how far the intellect can go , and where it is useless ; andsecondlyin showing that there is nevertheless
, , a region of thoughts beyond , and altogether out of , the sphere of sense and intellect . Accordingly he , with perfect correctness , has designated his philosophy transcendental , inasmuch as it is conversant with the laws of this superior part of the mind . According to him , the ideas of God and the soul do not admit of any reduction to a process of argumentation concerning their nature . The only approximation that can be made is the negative description that they are not matter , and that
we have no faculties to appreciate what they are ; but that they exist is not doubtful . Their effects are constantly around us , and we are as much compelled to believe in their being as in the simplest conclusions of the understanding . Our limits compel us to contract the further development of this interesting topic , in order to hasten to speak of the moral sense by which , as we stated in an early part of the essay , all doctrine should be tested . Besides the powers of sense , understanding , and reason , with which man is gifted , he possesses desires . AVhen these desires are occupied with sensual impressions , pleasure is their object : when the
desirinofaculty is occupied with categories of the understanding , in other words , with intellectual gratification , happiness is sought for ; when desire is directed to the region of ideas , our object is virtue . Thus what is commonly called the moral sense , is only a desire for a peculiar species of gratification—the consciousness of doing our duty . But we have said in the early part of this paper , that men differ in some measure as to the particular acts which are virtuous . This difference
arises from their mixing the desire for sensual or intellectual pleasure with the noble desire of virtue ; and thus the savage , in his revenge , mixes with the desire of justice the gratification he derives from overcoming an opponent . And the vanity of standing well in public opinion is so evidently the chief spur to the duellist , that the sense of duty forms but a very small fraction in the sum of his motives . But a pure morality is founded on the ideas of reason solely , and hence the inseparable connexion between morality and relirrion . Thus , one of tlie ntti- ;_
butes which reason assigns to God is perfect goodness ; so perfect goodness is what the moral desire is ever striving to attain . Moderate pleasure , moderate happiness I am content with ; but with moderate chastity or moderate honour the virtuous mind can never rest satisfied ; these must be perfect . Again , it is necessary to the pure conception of the Deity that he should be above our grovelling notions , derived from things in time and space ; and the moral desires demands also that virtue should be beyond the agencies of the material world or sensual emotions ; that all expediency , fear of pain , love of oneself be disregarded .
It had been our purpose to show the perfect accordance that exists between the system of morals which flows from these principles and the doctrines of Scripture revelation , - but the great extent of the subject compels us to conclude . Our readers will doubtless , however , seethe coincidence in a general manner , and on a future occasion we may probably resume the subject .
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software.
Remarks
if the soul were neither matter nor motion , it must be nothing—but thaS as it produced effects , it must be something ; and then these logicians give us a choice of whether it shall be a fine matter , an essence , or an animal spirit ; or whether it be a secretion , and whether it is lodged in the heart , or the brain , or the pineal gland . Now the great claims of Kant consist , first , in pointing out how far the intellect can go , and where it is useless ; andsecondlyin showing that there is nevertheless
, , a region of thoughts beyond , and altogether out of , the sphere of sense and intellect . Accordingly he , with perfect correctness , has designated his philosophy transcendental , inasmuch as it is conversant with the laws of this superior part of the mind . According to him , the ideas of God and the soul do not admit of any reduction to a process of argumentation concerning their nature . The only approximation that can be made is the negative description that they are not matter , and that
we have no faculties to appreciate what they are ; but that they exist is not doubtful . Their effects are constantly around us , and we are as much compelled to believe in their being as in the simplest conclusions of the understanding . Our limits compel us to contract the further development of this interesting topic , in order to hasten to speak of the moral sense by which , as we stated in an early part of the essay , all doctrine should be tested . Besides the powers of sense , understanding , and reason , with which man is gifted , he possesses desires . AVhen these desires are occupied with sensual impressions , pleasure is their object : when the
desirinofaculty is occupied with categories of the understanding , in other words , with intellectual gratification , happiness is sought for ; when desire is directed to the region of ideas , our object is virtue . Thus what is commonly called the moral sense , is only a desire for a peculiar species of gratification—the consciousness of doing our duty . But we have said in the early part of this paper , that men differ in some measure as to the particular acts which are virtuous . This difference
arises from their mixing the desire for sensual or intellectual pleasure with the noble desire of virtue ; and thus the savage , in his revenge , mixes with the desire of justice the gratification he derives from overcoming an opponent . And the vanity of standing well in public opinion is so evidently the chief spur to the duellist , that the sense of duty forms but a very small fraction in the sum of his motives . But a pure morality is founded on the ideas of reason solely , and hence the inseparable connexion between morality and relirrion . Thus , one of tlie ntti- ;_
butes which reason assigns to God is perfect goodness ; so perfect goodness is what the moral desire is ever striving to attain . Moderate pleasure , moderate happiness I am content with ; but with moderate chastity or moderate honour the virtuous mind can never rest satisfied ; these must be perfect . Again , it is necessary to the pure conception of the Deity that he should be above our grovelling notions , derived from things in time and space ; and the moral desires demands also that virtue should be beyond the agencies of the material world or sensual emotions ; that all expediency , fear of pain , love of oneself be disregarded .
It had been our purpose to show the perfect accordance that exists between the system of morals which flows from these principles and the doctrines of Scripture revelation , - but the great extent of the subject compels us to conclude . Our readers will doubtless , however , seethe coincidence in a general manner , and on a future occasion we may probably resume the subject .