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Article LEIBNIZ AND SPINOZA. ← Page 8 of 25 →
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Leibniz And Spinoza.
us the same sympathy Avhich Ave exhibit , should occasion arise . NOAV , if this is an expectation from the individuals whom Ave assist , it would be simply absurd . No man gives a beggar a penny in the hope that , should he become a beggar himself , that man will in turn relieve him in like manner . And certainly , if this were the motiveit would not rest satisfied AA'ith so small a
, gift . And if , on the other hand , it be an expectation from mankind in general , that as we are kind and charitable to those AVIIO are in misfortune , so we may have a right to expect that should misfortune fall on us , charity and kindness may be displayed towards us in turn , —then it becomes an appeal to the justice of ProA'idence ; and surely , however far-fetched , it cannot
be blamed . But , in fact , our conduct in this respect rarely has reference to ourselves at all , save in a Avidely different way . There are , indeed , many Avho shrink from objects of distress ; they are painful to behold , and to get rid of them a trifle is Avell bestowed . Others , again , relieve the unfortunate to escape importunity ; but both these cases , though they may appear to come under the title of charity , do not come under that of pity ; and pity is the feeling concerning Avhich our author declares that it Avill be found to centre in self .
Not less severe is the Abbe on friendship : he does not exactly treat it as though it Avere merely a name , but he regards it as a kind of contract , by which aid and esteem on one side are bartered for the same commodities on the other—in youth , a mutual pursuit of pleasure , in middle age , of profit;—that there is such a thing as the ambition to be thought faithful in
friendship , and that there is much pleasure in having it thought that Ave have many and sincere friends . Leibniz observes that all this may be very true , and there is no harm in it , but that the highest kind of friendship is that Avhich rests on a common possession of the highest qualities . There is , however , something more arbitrary in friendship than all that philosophers
haA ^ e ever said about it . My friend is noble , generous , virtuousbut it is not simply for those things that I regard him , or I should be obliged to love equall y all Avhom I knoAV and believe to be equally noble , generous , and virtuous . It is true , esteem makes a considerable element in my regard for him , and I should feel my friendship lessened Avere the qualities lessened in
my friend ; but the real cause of my friendship is that there is some peculiar sympathy between us , some common feeling Avhich unites us , and which we could not define nor describe , but which makes us more attached than we can be to men AVIIO may , nevertheless , be much better in every Avay than Ave can pretend to be ourselves . In like manner , our antipathies are
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software.
Leibniz And Spinoza.
us the same sympathy Avhich Ave exhibit , should occasion arise . NOAV , if this is an expectation from the individuals whom Ave assist , it would be simply absurd . No man gives a beggar a penny in the hope that , should he become a beggar himself , that man will in turn relieve him in like manner . And certainly , if this were the motiveit would not rest satisfied AA'ith so small a
, gift . And if , on the other hand , it be an expectation from mankind in general , that as we are kind and charitable to those AVIIO are in misfortune , so we may have a right to expect that should misfortune fall on us , charity and kindness may be displayed towards us in turn , —then it becomes an appeal to the justice of ProA'idence ; and surely , however far-fetched , it cannot
be blamed . But , in fact , our conduct in this respect rarely has reference to ourselves at all , save in a Avidely different way . There are , indeed , many Avho shrink from objects of distress ; they are painful to behold , and to get rid of them a trifle is Avell bestowed . Others , again , relieve the unfortunate to escape importunity ; but both these cases , though they may appear to come under the title of charity , do not come under that of pity ; and pity is the feeling concerning Avhich our author declares that it Avill be found to centre in self .
Not less severe is the Abbe on friendship : he does not exactly treat it as though it Avere merely a name , but he regards it as a kind of contract , by which aid and esteem on one side are bartered for the same commodities on the other—in youth , a mutual pursuit of pleasure , in middle age , of profit;—that there is such a thing as the ambition to be thought faithful in
friendship , and that there is much pleasure in having it thought that Ave have many and sincere friends . Leibniz observes that all this may be very true , and there is no harm in it , but that the highest kind of friendship is that Avhich rests on a common possession of the highest qualities . There is , however , something more arbitrary in friendship than all that philosophers
haA ^ e ever said about it . My friend is noble , generous , virtuousbut it is not simply for those things that I regard him , or I should be obliged to love equall y all Avhom I knoAV and believe to be equally noble , generous , and virtuous . It is true , esteem makes a considerable element in my regard for him , and I should feel my friendship lessened Avere the qualities lessened in
my friend ; but the real cause of my friendship is that there is some peculiar sympathy between us , some common feeling Avhich unites us , and which we could not define nor describe , but which makes us more attached than we can be to men AVIIO may , nevertheless , be much better in every Avay than Ave can pretend to be ourselves . In like manner , our antipathies are