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Article LEIBNIZ AND SPINOZA. ← Page 21 of 25 →
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Leibniz And Spinoza.
attributes in an infinite degree , —and if at the same time there be anything like au immutable chain of events , then these last must be OA'erruled and pre-arranged by the Divine will , so that any event may just as well be referred at once to the Avill of the Supreme Being , as to any chain of circumstances overruled by that willand that for the very purpose of carrying out its
, decisions . Let it be imagined for a moment , that a severance could be made between the Divine Avill , as absolute , and the chain of immutable events , each determined by its precedents . We should then have a God , AA-hose acts were all arranged according to a fixed order , and AVIIO was only free to act upon himself ; and thus we should find Leibniz and Spinoza agreed .
Their Deity Avould be one absolutely inactive in his own creation ; and both Avould have to account , as consistently as they might , for the proofs of love and Avisdom , as Avell as of poAver , with which the universe abounds . The moment Ave have driven the Leibnizian theory to its consequencesand shown that it must terminate in the
acknoAvled-, g ment of a diA'ine predestination , Ave may finish the argument by disregarding all the prior steps , and treating only this last . There is undoubtedly something very striking and even sublime in the fact , that Avhen men begin to philosophize about free-Avill and responsibility , on the ground that they are capable of so far comprehending the diA'ine nature as to be able to argue
concerning God as they do concerning man , the ground gradually seems to slide from under them , and all their theories are at last SAvalloAved up in the one ovei'Avhelming doctrine of a diA'ine predestination . Now there is a reply to this doctrine , one Avhich admits the omniscience of the Supreme Being , and yet claims free agency for man , recognises his responsibility , and lays before him the divine laAV as his one sufficient rule of action .
Our present business is , however , not Avith the theory of the divine predestination , but Avith the necessitarian scheme as laid doAvn by Leibniz . He asserts an immutable chain of events , and he at the same time teaches the doctrine of a personal , all-controlling , all-Avise , and all-loving Creator . We have seen one Avay to demonstrate tlie incongruity of these two positions ; Ave may
dtive the holder of them into predestination , but , besides this mode of treating the subject , Ave may observe that , if we believe in a Great Architect of the Universe upholding and controlling all things , Ave must necessarily cast aside any notion of an immutable chain of events , save on grounds AA'hich deny man ' s free-will , and nullify his responsibility . NOAV the uniformity
ofthe divine government is such that men , for the convenience of reasoning , make laws , —laAA's of nature out of its regularity ; VOL . II . 2 D
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software.
Leibniz And Spinoza.
attributes in an infinite degree , —and if at the same time there be anything like au immutable chain of events , then these last must be OA'erruled and pre-arranged by the Divine will , so that any event may just as well be referred at once to the Avill of the Supreme Being , as to any chain of circumstances overruled by that willand that for the very purpose of carrying out its
, decisions . Let it be imagined for a moment , that a severance could be made between the Divine Avill , as absolute , and the chain of immutable events , each determined by its precedents . We should then have a God , AA-hose acts were all arranged according to a fixed order , and AVIIO was only free to act upon himself ; and thus we should find Leibniz and Spinoza agreed .
Their Deity Avould be one absolutely inactive in his own creation ; and both Avould have to account , as consistently as they might , for the proofs of love and Avisdom , as Avell as of poAver , with which the universe abounds . The moment Ave have driven the Leibnizian theory to its consequencesand shown that it must terminate in the
acknoAvled-, g ment of a diA'ine predestination , Ave may finish the argument by disregarding all the prior steps , and treating only this last . There is undoubtedly something very striking and even sublime in the fact , that Avhen men begin to philosophize about free-Avill and responsibility , on the ground that they are capable of so far comprehending the diA'ine nature as to be able to argue
concerning God as they do concerning man , the ground gradually seems to slide from under them , and all their theories are at last SAvalloAved up in the one ovei'Avhelming doctrine of a diA'ine predestination . Now there is a reply to this doctrine , one Avhich admits the omniscience of the Supreme Being , and yet claims free agency for man , recognises his responsibility , and lays before him the divine laAV as his one sufficient rule of action .
Our present business is , however , not Avith the theory of the divine predestination , but Avith the necessitarian scheme as laid doAvn by Leibniz . He asserts an immutable chain of events , and he at the same time teaches the doctrine of a personal , all-controlling , all-Avise , and all-loving Creator . We have seen one Avay to demonstrate tlie incongruity of these two positions ; Ave may
dtive the holder of them into predestination , but , besides this mode of treating the subject , Ave may observe that , if we believe in a Great Architect of the Universe upholding and controlling all things , Ave must necessarily cast aside any notion of an immutable chain of events , save on grounds AA'hich deny man ' s free-will , and nullify his responsibility . NOAV the uniformity
ofthe divine government is such that men , for the convenience of reasoning , make laws , —laAA's of nature out of its regularity ; VOL . II . 2 D