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Article LEIBNIZ AND SPINOZA. ← Page 12 of 25 →
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Leibniz And Spinoza.
bound to do so , she did voluntarily make the sacrifice , then it would , according to the theory before us , become an act of heroic virtue , and the girl would be better than there Avas any necessity for her being . Let the same solution be again applied : there are many causes for Avhich men are called by duty to lay down their livescases in AA'hich they are bound to
, say with Pompey , It is necessary to do such and such things , " it is not necessary to live ; " if the woman in question were coiiA'inced that this was one of those occasions , then her act would have been an act of duty , and no more . Had she only perceiA'ed the superiority of the archbishop as a fact , and not as bearing on the question of preservation , then the act AA'Ould no
longer be limited by the bounds of duty , and so far from transcending them , it would become merely a brilliant error . We are accountable for our lives to the great Giver of them ; Ave are bound not to relinquish them , save at the imperative call of duty ; and however apparently heroic any self-sacrifice may be , it is one of two things only—an act coming strictly AA'ithin the limits of absolute duty , or it is a magnificent sin .
We must turn now to the metaphysics of Leibniz ; and here one of the principal points for our notice must be that modification of fatalism of Avhich he Avas the advocate . As a Chiistian , the great philosopher would not absolutely deny that the human will is free , but he veiled his ideas on the subject in a little sophistry ; he did as many of his inferiors have clone , —he
accepted premises , and denied consequences . Fatalism has been taught in many Avays . One Avas put forth by Augustine ; it is a theistic fatalism , and is draAvn from the supposed attributes ofthe Supreme Being . "If God , " say the advocates of this form , " foreknows all things , all things must be previously fixed , for it is not possible with certainty to foreknow that Avhich
is not certain to take place ; but as all things are controlled by Divine Providence , as well as foreseen by the Divine Prescience , all things must be as certainly fore-ordained by the Divine Authority . " This doctrine abolishes at once free-Avill and responsibility , makes mea just so many machines , and tells us that the righteousness of the righteous , and the wickedness of the wicked , and all the consequences of one and the other in this world and in that to come , are pre-arranged by the same infallible wisdom and the same immutable Avill .
The doctrine of Leibniz dealt with the question after another fashion ; he set forth an immutable chain of unavoidable causes and effects . Let us take an instance . I am seated in a chair in my study , I am a free agent , if I will I can walk from this chair to the other end of the room , or I can forbear ; whether
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software.
Leibniz And Spinoza.
bound to do so , she did voluntarily make the sacrifice , then it would , according to the theory before us , become an act of heroic virtue , and the girl would be better than there Avas any necessity for her being . Let the same solution be again applied : there are many causes for Avhich men are called by duty to lay down their livescases in AA'hich they are bound to
, say with Pompey , It is necessary to do such and such things , " it is not necessary to live ; " if the woman in question were coiiA'inced that this was one of those occasions , then her act would have been an act of duty , and no more . Had she only perceiA'ed the superiority of the archbishop as a fact , and not as bearing on the question of preservation , then the act AA'Ould no
longer be limited by the bounds of duty , and so far from transcending them , it would become merely a brilliant error . We are accountable for our lives to the great Giver of them ; Ave are bound not to relinquish them , save at the imperative call of duty ; and however apparently heroic any self-sacrifice may be , it is one of two things only—an act coming strictly AA'ithin the limits of absolute duty , or it is a magnificent sin .
We must turn now to the metaphysics of Leibniz ; and here one of the principal points for our notice must be that modification of fatalism of Avhich he Avas the advocate . As a Chiistian , the great philosopher would not absolutely deny that the human will is free , but he veiled his ideas on the subject in a little sophistry ; he did as many of his inferiors have clone , —he
accepted premises , and denied consequences . Fatalism has been taught in many Avays . One Avas put forth by Augustine ; it is a theistic fatalism , and is draAvn from the supposed attributes ofthe Supreme Being . "If God , " say the advocates of this form , " foreknows all things , all things must be previously fixed , for it is not possible with certainty to foreknow that Avhich
is not certain to take place ; but as all things are controlled by Divine Providence , as well as foreseen by the Divine Prescience , all things must be as certainly fore-ordained by the Divine Authority . " This doctrine abolishes at once free-Avill and responsibility , makes mea just so many machines , and tells us that the righteousness of the righteous , and the wickedness of the wicked , and all the consequences of one and the other in this world and in that to come , are pre-arranged by the same infallible wisdom and the same immutable Avill .
The doctrine of Leibniz dealt with the question after another fashion ; he set forth an immutable chain of unavoidable causes and effects . Let us take an instance . I am seated in a chair in my study , I am a free agent , if I will I can walk from this chair to the other end of the room , or I can forbear ; whether