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Article LEIBNIZ AND SPINOZA. ← Page 15 of 25 →
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Leibniz And Spinoza.
to questions of politics ?—he may have picked up that tract at Cambridge at a book-stall . Had it been a Avet day , he might have stayed quietly in his rooms ; an hour later another person might have purchased that very tract ; a long chain of causes took him to the seaport from Avhich it was his design to have emigrated to America ; a similar chain induced the king ' s
resolution to stop certain persons from emigration ; and thus every event may be believed , and is believed by many , to have an immutable connection with every event that Aveut before , so that if these had not happened neither could this . This theory holds very Avell together . NOAV let us revieAV the steps . I . No man acts without a motive . II . The strongest motiA'e will always determine the action . III . The result of any juncture can be but ONE , and may be foreseen .
IV . Circumstances are determined one by another in an immutable chain . In the former ease , according to the theory of Augustine , fatalism takes the form of predestination , and springs from the attributes of the Deity . In the latter , that of Zeno and Leibniz , it takes the form of necessity , and springs from the constitution of nature .
It may serve , as a curious exercise on this problem , to examine the motives Avhich induce me to rise from my chair and walk to the other end of the room . I am not determined by any outward circumstances , I am about to make an experiment on the freedom of my OAVU will . The predestinarian tells me that God has already decided whether I shall rise or not ; the
necessitarian tells me that I shall be decided by the strongest motive , and that every event that has taken place since the world began has been at work in framing these motives . Both tell me that there can be but one result , and that I am therefore no free agent in the matter , —free , indeed , to obey , but not free to form my resolution : the question is decidedI rise and walk ;
, but UOAV comes the problem , ¦—could I , under these peculiar circumstances , have done otherwise ? Men in general say at once , " To be sure you could ; had you so Avilled , you might have remained sitting ; " no doubt ; but could I have so AA'illed ? My two philosophers say " No ! " and this is the question to Avhich Ave have now to supply an ansAver . If I am strong and energetic
, I shall very likely proA'e my power by the more active of the tAvo courses ; if I am languid or weary , by the latter ; or I may be induced to do that which is contrary to my bodily comfort by the notion that I am thereby proving my freedom to take which side of the alternative I choose ; these Avill probably be the only
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software.
Leibniz And Spinoza.
to questions of politics ?—he may have picked up that tract at Cambridge at a book-stall . Had it been a Avet day , he might have stayed quietly in his rooms ; an hour later another person might have purchased that very tract ; a long chain of causes took him to the seaport from Avhich it was his design to have emigrated to America ; a similar chain induced the king ' s
resolution to stop certain persons from emigration ; and thus every event may be believed , and is believed by many , to have an immutable connection with every event that Aveut before , so that if these had not happened neither could this . This theory holds very Avell together . NOAV let us revieAV the steps . I . No man acts without a motive . II . The strongest motiA'e will always determine the action . III . The result of any juncture can be but ONE , and may be foreseen .
IV . Circumstances are determined one by another in an immutable chain . In the former ease , according to the theory of Augustine , fatalism takes the form of predestination , and springs from the attributes of the Deity . In the latter , that of Zeno and Leibniz , it takes the form of necessity , and springs from the constitution of nature .
It may serve , as a curious exercise on this problem , to examine the motives Avhich induce me to rise from my chair and walk to the other end of the room . I am not determined by any outward circumstances , I am about to make an experiment on the freedom of my OAVU will . The predestinarian tells me that God has already decided whether I shall rise or not ; the
necessitarian tells me that I shall be decided by the strongest motive , and that every event that has taken place since the world began has been at work in framing these motives . Both tell me that there can be but one result , and that I am therefore no free agent in the matter , —free , indeed , to obey , but not free to form my resolution : the question is decidedI rise and walk ;
, but UOAV comes the problem , ¦—could I , under these peculiar circumstances , have done otherwise ? Men in general say at once , " To be sure you could ; had you so Avilled , you might have remained sitting ; " no doubt ; but could I have so AA'illed ? My two philosophers say " No ! " and this is the question to Avhich Ave have now to supply an ansAver . If I am strong and energetic
, I shall very likely proA'e my power by the more active of the tAvo courses ; if I am languid or weary , by the latter ; or I may be induced to do that which is contrary to my bodily comfort by the notion that I am thereby proving my freedom to take which side of the alternative I choose ; these Avill probably be the only