Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software.
Critical Notices Of The Literature Of The Last Three Months,
interested in following the course of the allied forces in tho Baltic , with greater interest than that which has been recently published under the auspices , as well as professional editorship of General Mouteith . We allude to the " Narrative of the Conquest of Finland by the Russians in the year 1808-9 , " * from an unpublished work by a Russian officer . The importance , indeed , of this volume , now that the Erench and English forces are actually operatingor about to operatein the very country of which
, , it treats , is hardly to be oA'errated . We all know how Einland was robbed from Sweden by Alexander , with the sanction of Napoleon ; and it will be now curious to watch the course of events by which , in all probability , another Napoleon may , with the sanction and assistance of England , reannex Einland to Sweden , as the price of the military co-operation of the latter country against Nicholas . Indeed , to hold Einland , the assistance of Sweden would appear to be almost indispensable , asfrom the peculiar
, character and scanty resources of the . country itself , an army which can fall back on friendly land for supplies is indispensable ; otherwise the constant presence of a large fleet of a particular description of ships , constantly watching and following the movements of the army for the purpose of providing supplies , would be necessary , and the cost , both in treasure and men , to provide such , would be hardly worth the gain Avhich the temporary occupation of Einland would be to the allied forces , or the
loss Avhich its conquest would be to Russia . The difficulties , however , of a campaign in Einland , owing as much to the climate as to the innumerable lakes , torrents , forests , and masses of rock , would not be slight . Large concentrated masses of troops would be as useless , as small , well-disciplined , guerilla bands of hardy men , would be certain of ultimate success , it is a curious fact in military history , that Gustavus the Eourth lost Einland by a large army ; while Russia conquered it by small
detachments of troops , spread over the whole face of the country ; and yet there is no question but the Swedish forces were quite equal , if not superior , in military skill , organization , and courage to the Russians . Independently , therefore , of the literary merit attached to the work , we do not hesitate to say , that its value at this juncture is peculiarly great . Another work of kindred interest and equal importance is General Macintosh ' s " Military Tour in Turkey , " t undertaken with certain specific
objects , essentially professional , and likely enough now to prove of value . The author seems to have minutely surveyed the whole southern frontiers of Russia , bordering on Turkey and Persia ; to have examined the Bulgarian fortifications , as well as those of Sebastopol and the Crimea , with a view to discover the chances of success which an invading force would have . In his opinion , the task would be no easy one , involving , in all probability , a long campaign , and considerable risk of failure . Moreover , the land side of Sebastopol appears to be more formidably fortified than the recent accounts would have led us to believe : — "So late as last year , " says General Macintosh , "travellers , who , however ,
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software.
Critical Notices Of The Literature Of The Last Three Months,
interested in following the course of the allied forces in tho Baltic , with greater interest than that which has been recently published under the auspices , as well as professional editorship of General Mouteith . We allude to the " Narrative of the Conquest of Finland by the Russians in the year 1808-9 , " * from an unpublished work by a Russian officer . The importance , indeed , of this volume , now that the Erench and English forces are actually operatingor about to operatein the very country of which
, , it treats , is hardly to be oA'errated . We all know how Einland was robbed from Sweden by Alexander , with the sanction of Napoleon ; and it will be now curious to watch the course of events by which , in all probability , another Napoleon may , with the sanction and assistance of England , reannex Einland to Sweden , as the price of the military co-operation of the latter country against Nicholas . Indeed , to hold Einland , the assistance of Sweden would appear to be almost indispensable , asfrom the peculiar
, character and scanty resources of the . country itself , an army which can fall back on friendly land for supplies is indispensable ; otherwise the constant presence of a large fleet of a particular description of ships , constantly watching and following the movements of the army for the purpose of providing supplies , would be necessary , and the cost , both in treasure and men , to provide such , would be hardly worth the gain Avhich the temporary occupation of Einland would be to the allied forces , or the
loss Avhich its conquest would be to Russia . The difficulties , however , of a campaign in Einland , owing as much to the climate as to the innumerable lakes , torrents , forests , and masses of rock , would not be slight . Large concentrated masses of troops would be as useless , as small , well-disciplined , guerilla bands of hardy men , would be certain of ultimate success , it is a curious fact in military history , that Gustavus the Eourth lost Einland by a large army ; while Russia conquered it by small
detachments of troops , spread over the whole face of the country ; and yet there is no question but the Swedish forces were quite equal , if not superior , in military skill , organization , and courage to the Russians . Independently , therefore , of the literary merit attached to the work , we do not hesitate to say , that its value at this juncture is peculiarly great . Another work of kindred interest and equal importance is General Macintosh ' s " Military Tour in Turkey , " t undertaken with certain specific
objects , essentially professional , and likely enough now to prove of value . The author seems to have minutely surveyed the whole southern frontiers of Russia , bordering on Turkey and Persia ; to have examined the Bulgarian fortifications , as well as those of Sebastopol and the Crimea , with a view to discover the chances of success which an invading force would have . In his opinion , the task would be no easy one , involving , in all probability , a long campaign , and considerable risk of failure . Moreover , the land side of Sebastopol appears to be more formidably fortified than the recent accounts would have led us to believe : — "So late as last year , " says General Macintosh , "travellers , who , however ,